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Summary
Alcohol tax is widely recognised as one of the most important instruments governments have to 
address harmful drinking. Yet increases in duty are often resisted because of concerns that they 
are regressive and will therefore exacerbate inequalities. 
It is unclear from the existing evidence how well-founded such fears are in the UK. Poorer 
households drink less alcohol on average. Yet surveys suggest that lower income households 
spend a greater share of their incomes on alcohol. On the other hand, surveys also find that 
alcohol accounts for a smaller share of the expenditure of lower spending households. This raises 
the question of whether income or expenditure is a better indicator of a household’s economic 
circumstances. We find both have limitations, but expenditure appears to be somewhat more 
reliable because of consistent under-reporting of income in official surveys. 
In this report, we build on previous studies by directly estimating how much alcohol tax different 
households pay (rather than using total spending on alcohol as a proxy). Recognising that no 
indicator of affluence is perfect, we compare alcohol tax burdens across a range of measures: 
income, expenditure, occupational class, housing size and tenure and car ownership.  
Overall, we find little difference between better-off and worse-off households in terms of the share 
of their income or expenditure accounted for by alcohol duty – at worst alcohol duty is only mildly 
regressive:
• The very richest 10-20% do pay proportionately less
• The bottom 10% may pay proportionately slightly more, but it is difficult to be certain because 
of data limitations
However, this varies between different alcohol taxes because of differences in drink preferences:
• Wine duty is clearly progressive 
• Beer, cider and particularly spirits duty appear somewhat regressive
In any case, there are three factors that may mitigate the regressivity of any increase in 
alcohol duty:
• If poorer households are more price sensitive, this means that they will pay less of any increase 
in alcohol duty
• If the revenue from alcohol duty is used to fund progressive government spending or tax cuts, 
this will almost certainly offset any negative effect on inequality
• Economically disadvantaged households will see more of the health benefits of higher 
alcohol duty
Recognising previous analysis has overwhelmingly focused on the impact of alcohol duty on 
economic rather than social groups, we also looked at how its impact varies by gender, age and 
region, based on their consumption preferences:
• Overall, women pay significantly less alcohol duty than men – drinks consumed by women 
account for around two fifths of all alcohol duty
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• Yet this varies substantially by product – men pay the vast bulk of beer and cider duty, women 
pay the majority of wine duty
• Wine duty also has greatest impact on middle aged drinkers, whereas beer, spirits and cider 
duty are more likely to be paid by younger drinkers
• Households in the North and Midlands pay proportionately more in beer duty, whereas 
households in Scotland spend the most on spirits duty
As with any fiscal policy, it is important to understand the distributional effects of alcohol duty. 
Based on the evidence we present here, we find little reason to avoid duty increases out of a 
concern for inequality.
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Introduction
Alcohol tax is one of the most important instruments that governments have to address harmful 
drinking. According to Public Health England, “Policies that reduce the affordability of alcohol are 
the most effective, and cost-effective, approaches to prevention and health improvement” [1].
The World Health Organization agrees that increasing alcohol taxes is a “very cost-effective” way 
of increasing healthy life [2]. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development sees 
them as a “powerful tool for health promotion” [3]. Real-terms cuts to alcohol duty since 2012 
are estimated to have led to over 2,200 deaths in England and Scotland. Conversely, a gradual 
increase in alcohol taxes above inflation between now and 2032 would be expected cumulatively 
to save over 5,000 lives [4]. 
Yet alcohol taxes are not just public health measures. They are also fiscal policies. As with any 
fiscal policy, distributional consequences are a major consideration. Who shoulders most of the 
burden of the tax, and who benefits from it? Does it exacerbate or mitigate existing inequalities? 
Fundamentally, is it fair? 
One of the most common objections to increasing taxes on alcohol is the belief that this will 
penalise the economically disadvantaged. In a discussion of so-called ‘sin taxes’, The Economist 
worried that such measures “affect low-income households most”, and so may “make the poor 
poorer” [5]. Such arguments have been taken up particularly by alcohol industry trade bodies 
and right-wing think tanks. The Scotch Whisky Association has dismissed proposals to raise 
spirits duty as “regressive”, while the Wine and Spirit Trade Association urged the government to 
“ease pressure on cash strapped consumers” by lowering alcohol taxes [6]. In recent years, the 
TaxPayers’ Alliance has also claimed that alcohol duty “hurts the poor” [7] and that wine duty 
specifically is “deeply regressive and hits those on lower incomes the hardest” [8].
It is not only economic inequalities that concern policymakers. In the past few years, there has 
been greater recognition that taxes have different effects on different social groups. In a 2017 
parliamentary debate, the Labour MP Gill Furniss noted that the Treasury’s equalities impact 
statement on alcohol duty “failed to outline the specific equalities impact with respect to gender”, 
and suggested that future Budgets should take into consideration differences in drinks preferences 
between men and women [9]. The Women’s Budget Group has also regularly criticised government 
cuts to alcohol duty for disproportionately benefitting men [10-12]. Several governments have 
introduced ‘gender budgeting’: estimating the differences in the impact of taxation and spending 
measures on men and women, and using this to guide policy [13]. Age has also emerged as a major 
political divide in modern Britain, and consequently there have been calls for the intergenerational 
impact of tax policies to receive more attention [14]. Similarly, the gap in prosperity between the 
different UK regions has been a major political concern in recent times, and is expected to be a 
focus of the forthcoming Budget in March 2020 [15].
This report seeks to identify some of the winners and losers of UK alcohol tax. The first part looks 
at whether alcohol tax is regressive – that is, whether it places a disproportionate burden on the 
poor. It begins by reviewing the existing evidence and literature on the question, outlining in 
detail the methodological difficulties in defining and identifying poorer groups. It then presents 
new analysis of UK survey data, examining how the estimated financial burden of each alcohol tax 
varies, using a range of measures of economic advantage and disadvantage. Finally, it attempts to 
contextualise these results, by identifying different factors that may mitigate any regressive effect 
of alcohol taxes.  
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The second part turns to the financial impact of different alcohol taxes on different genders, age 
groups and regions. It produces new estimates, again drawing on the best available survey data, 
for how the burden is distributed between these different groups. 
Discussion of the distributional impact of alcohol taxes is often based on speculation and 
supposition. In this report, we add more robust evidence, in the hope of contributing to a more 
informed debate. 
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Part 1: Does UK alcohol tax disproportionately fall 
on the poor? 
Previous evidence
We begin by reviewing existing analysis and evidence on the distributional effects of alcohol 
taxes. First, we outline the international academic literature. We then turn to the UK and look 
at how levels of drinking vary between socio-economic groups. Such figures do not account 
for differences in households’ ability to pay, and so we then look at analyses of the proportion 
of income and expenditure that spending on alcohol accounts for. Since the results for income 
are different to the results for expenditure, we then review the literature on whether income or 
expenditure is a better measure of a household’s economic circumstances. 
International academic literature
In general, a tax is said to be regressive if it costs the poor a higher share of their income than the 
rich. As we have seen, many people believe (or perhaps just assume) that alcohol tax is, in this 
sense, regressive. Proponents of lower duty rates have claimed that “There is little argument in 
the academic literature about the regressivity of alcohol taxes” [16]. This is an overstatement.1 
While studies in some countries (for example, Australia [18], the US [19] and South Africa [20]) 
have found that alcohol taxes place a proportionately greater burden on the poor, others have 
found a different, or more complex, relationship. For instance, Ashton et al find that households 
towards the bottom and middle of the income distribution in New Zealand pay around the same 
share of their income in alcohol taxes, but that the highest earners pay proportionately less tax 
[21]. By contrast, Sassi et al find that alcohol taxes are slightly progressive (i.e. the rich pay a 
higher share of their income) in Chile, Turkey and Poland [22].
Alcohol consumption by income and socio-economic status in the UK
In any case, given the vastly different alcohol policies, drinking patterns and economic structures 
of different countries, these results are not a reliable guide to the impact of British alcohol taxes. 
For that, we need to look at evidence from the UK. A good place to start is with data on levels of 
alcohol consumption. The Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) Opinion and Lifestyle Survey shows 
that the poorer a person is, the less likely they are to drink or drink frequently. As figure 1 shows, 
28% of people earning under £10,000 a year are teetotal, compared to just 6% of those earning 
over £40,000. 14% of those in the highest income group drink alcohol five times a week, compared 
to 7% of those in the lowest income group.
1  As even the libertarian critic of alcohol duty, Christopher Snowdon, appears to have acknowledged more recently, referencing studies that 
show that alcohol is a “partial exception” to the regressivity of consumption taxes [17]
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Figure 1: Frequency of drinking alcohol by income – Great Britain, 2017 [23]
The same pattern holds for other measures of prosperity and socio-economic status. The 
unemployed and economically inactive drink less frequently than those in employment (figure 2). 
Those with lower educational attainment and of a lower occupational class drink less frequently 
than those higher up the ladder (figure 3).
Figure 2: Frequency of drinking alcohol by employment status – Great Britain, 2017 [24]
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Figure 3: Frequency of drinking alcohol by educational attainment and social class  – Great Britain, 
2017 [23]
Furthermore, the Health Survey for England shows that people living in the most deprived areas 
are least likely to exceed guideline levels of drinking. 18% of people living in the most deprived 
quintile drink more than 14 units a week, compared to 27% in the least deprived quintile, as figure 
4 shows [24]. Comparable surveys find much the same pattern for Scotland [25].
Figure 4: Weekly alcohol consumption by index of multiple deprivation – England, 2018 [24]
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Alcohol spending by income and expenditure in the UK
While all of this indicates that poorer people drink less, and therefore likely pay less alcohol tax 
in absolute terms, this does not necessarily mean that alcohol tax is progressive. It may still be 
that relative to their ability to pay, poorer people face a greater burden from alcohol tax. Paying 
£100 in alcohol duty is more onerous for a household bringing in £10,000 a year than £120 is for a 
household on £60,000.
To account for this, we need to look at how much alcohol duty households pay as a proportion of 
their total financial resources. The most detailed and reliable source of data on British household 
spending and economic circumstances is the Office for National Statistics’ Living Costs and Food 
survey (LCFS). However, the version of this dataset that is generally available to researchers does 
not provide the relevant information to estimate a household’s alcohol tax payments directly. As 
a result, previous analyses have tended to use a household’s spending on alcohol, which is more 
easily available, as a proxy for how much they pay in alcohol tax. As we shall see, this approach 
has significant limitations. In this report, therefore, we have estimated alcohol duty payments 
more directly using a version of the survey only available to researchers on application under 
secure access conditions. 
In its 2016 Green Budget, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) found that households in the bottom 
10% of the income distribution of the 2013 LCFS pay the highest share of their income on alcohol 
(3.6%), whereas the top 10% pay the lowest share of their income on alcohol - 1.9% (figure 5) [26]. 
This would appear to indicate that alcohol tax is regressive.  
Figure 5: Share of income spent on alcohol by income decile – UK, 20132 [26]
2  Data kindly provided by and reproduced with the permission of Peter Levell.
AN INSTITUTE OF ALCOHOL STUDIES REPORT PAGE 12 
Yet income is not the only way to assess how well-off a household is. Sometimes economists prefer 
to use household spending as a measure of poverty or affluence.3 When the IFS compared the 
share of a household’s total spending accounted for by alcohol, they found an almost progressive 
pattern (figure 6). The bottom 10% of spenders spend the least on alcohol relative to their budget, 
and moving up the distribution, alcohol’s share of household budgets rises – at least up to the 
eighth decile. 
Figure 6: Share of total household expenditure spent on alcohol by spending decile – UK, 20134 [26]
Income vs expenditure as a measure of household prosperity
If alcohol expenditure looks regressive on the basis of income, but progressive on the basis of 
spending, the natural question is whether expenditure or income is a better indicator of how rich 
or poor a household is. The answer is that neither are perfect, but there are both theoretical and 
practical reasons to prefer spending, at least when it comes to UK survey data. 
Theoretically, we would expect spending to be less volatile than income, since households 
can use borrowing and saving to ‘smooth’ their spending over their lifetime. Consider the 
following cases:
• A pensioner running down their savings to supplement their pension
• A student borrowing money to support themselves through their degree as they anticipate 
they will land a lucrative graduate job
• A self-employed person who dips into their savings to help them through a bad year for 
their business.
3  Oddly, the ONS’ own analysis splits the difference – ranking households by income decile, but expressing their spending on alcohol 
as a share of total expenditure [27]. As might be expected this produces a distribution somewhere in between figures 5 and 6, without 
a clear recognisable trend.
4  Data kindly provided by and reproduced with the permission of Peter Levell.
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In each example, the person’s spending better reflects their long-term economic circumstances 
than their income. Indeed, using US data, Lyon and Schwab find that aggregating incomes over 
five years (which reduces some of this income volatility) partially reduces the apparent regressivity 
of alcohol taxes [28]. Yet even this may be too short a period to look at: many students and retirees 
will see little change in their income over five years.
Likely more significant are practical issues with data quality. There is strong evidence that incomes 
at the lower end of the distribution are systematically under-reported in household surveys 
[29,30]. A significant number of respondents to the LCFS report very low incomes, but relatively 
high expenditure [29]. This is most likely caused by the under-reporting of means-tested benefits 
– respondents may not know exactly how much they receive, or which benefits they draw on. 
Comparing against aggregate government data, Brewer et al find that the Living Costs and Food 
Survey accounts for just 50% of tax credits and 68% of income support [31].
By contrast, Brewer & O’Dea find that households with low reported spending in the LCFS are 
more recognisably poor according to a number of independent criteria [29]. Households reporting 
low spending generally report low incomes. They are also less likely than those with reported 
low incomes to have a range of household goods, including computers, internet connection, 
cars, dishwashers and washing machines. Spending is also a better predictor than income of the 
number of rooms a household had in their home. 
Further evidence that spending reports are more reliable than income comes from analysis of 
the Canadian Survey of Family Expenditures, which has found similar anomalies to the LCFS. 
Until 2010, respondents to the Canadian survey were asked to provide more detail if there was 
a discrepancy of more than 20% between their reported income and spending. Brzozowski & 
Crossley show that these cases tended to reveal under-reported income far more often than over-
reported expenditure [32].
All of this suggests that a significant proportion of those identified as low income in the LCFS 
are misclassified, whereas those who report low spending are more likely to actually be poor. 
This indicates that figure 6 (share of expenditure spent on alcohol) is more reliable than figure 5 
(share of income spent on alcohol), and so alcohol spending is more likely to be progressive than 
regressive. Yet even though household spending is a better indicator of affluence than income, it 
is still imperfect. Richer people save a higher proportion of their income [33], and do not spend 
all of their savings by the end of their lives [34]. Conversely, poorer people may be more likely to 
spend more than they earn over the course of their lifetimes. Moreover, even though expenditure 
data is thought to be more reliable than income data on the whole, there is still some evidence 
that it too suffers from under-reporting, and that higher income households under-report their 
spending by more [29]. Consequently looking only at spending risks understating the affluence 
of the rich, overstating how well-off the poor are, and so underestimating the regressivity of 
alcohol tax. 
New analysis
We build on the previous analysis in three ways. First, we directly estimate how much different 
households pay in alcohol duty, rather than using their spending on alcohol as a proxy. This is 
important because spending may produce a biased picture if tax accounts for a higher share of 
the price paid for alcohol by different groups. For example, around a third of the price paid by 
consumers for wine is tax, but only a fifth of beer prices [35]. Since richer households tend to drink 
more wine, this would suggest that the analysis above underestimates the amount of alcohol 
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duty richer households pay compared to the poor. On the other hand, alcohol duty accounts for 
a smaller share of the price of more expensive products. For example, the duty on a litre of 4% 
ABV beer is 76p. Yet this duty represents 19% of the retail price of a craft beer sold for £4/litre, but 
38% of the retail price of a standard beer sold for £2/litre. Since richer households tend to buy 
more expensive alcohol, this would suggest that our analysis so far overestimates the amount of 
alcohol duty richer households pay compared to the poor.
Second, in light of this debate over how best to identify richer and poorer households in survey 
data, we decided to test the hypothesis that poorer households spend proportionately more on 
alcohol duty using a range of different indicators of prosperity. Given the measurement issues with 
the standard metrics of income and expenditure, we decided to look not only at those two, but 
also at occupational class and other signifiers of living standards, such as housing size, housing 
tenure and car ownership.
Third, rather than looking only at alcohol as a whole, we separately estimate the distributional 
impact of beer, wine, spirits and cider duties.
Methods
We pooled data from three waves of the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS): 2013, 2014 and 
2015/16 [36].5 The LCFS interviews a random sample of UK households, and asks detailed 
questions about the income and major expenditures of each adult (16+) member of the 
household. Each adult is also asked to keep a spending diary over the course of two weeks. 
Interviews are spread evenly across the course of the year to avoid the results being influenced by 
seasonal variation [37]. 
We took transaction-level data from the spending diaries, and for every alcohol purchase, 
estimated the amount of duty paid. This required us to estimate the volume of drink purchased 
and, for beer and spirits, the strength of the drink. For most purchases, the exact volume of the 
product was captured in the survey. However, for some, we had to make assumptions about the 
size of containers – these are laid out in appendix A. The strength of the product was not captured 
in the survey – appendix B provides details of the assumptions we made about the alcoholic 
content of different drinks, based on market research data.
The amount of alcohol duty paid on each transaction was estimated by applying the duty rates 
in operation at the time of the survey. We then calculated the average duty paid for each product 
(beer, wine, spirits, cider) as a share of income and expenditure across all survey respondents. 
Households recorded as having extremely low incomes – either negative or less than a third of 
their total expenditure – were excluded from the analysis.
The survey estimates were multiplied by scaling factors to ensure they match official statistics. 
For example, the unadjusted survey estimate is that across the sample spirits duty accounts for 
0.21% of household disposable income on average. Yet official government spirits duty receipts 
[38] account for 0.26% of household disposable income in the national accounts [39]. To correct 
for this discrepancy (most likely due to under-recording of alcohol purchases), we multiplied the 
estimated spirits duty share of disposable income for each household by a scaling factor 1.22. 
Similar adjustments were made for beer, wine and cider duty as a share of income and expenditure. 
Overall, this increased the estimate of alcohol duty as a share of disposable income by 16%, and 
5  The most recent available wave of the survey - 2016/17 - was not usable as it was missing data on the quantity of alcohol purchased for a large 
proportion of the transactions
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as a share of expenditure by 9%. It also shifted the relative share of alcohol duty towards beer and 
spirits duty and away from wine duty. 
For each estimate, we calculated a 95% confidence interval using the standard errors and assuming 
a normal sampling distribution.   
Note that our analysis assumes that households pay the full amount of duty chargeable on a 
product. In practice, this assumption may not hold, since alcohol duty is levied on producers, 
and they or retailers may choose to absorb some of the alcohol duty, rather than passing it on 
to consumers in full. This may lead us to overstate the regressivity of alcohol duty, since cheaper 
products are less likely to pass duty onto consumers in full [40].
Results
Replicating previous analysis
We started by replicating the IFS’ analysis for our more recent data, calculating the proportion 
of equivalised household disposable income or expenditure spent on alcohol in each decile. As 
figures 7 and 8 show, we find broadly the same pattern as the IFS (though not quite as smooth) 
– higher earning households appear to spend a lower proportion of their income on alcohol, but 
higher spending households appear to spend a higher share of their budget on alcohol. That said, 
it is worth noting that beyond the very top and bottom of the distribution, these differences are 
not statistically significant, with the confidence intervals mostly overlapping. 
Figure 7: Alcohol spending as a share of equivalised disposable income by income decile
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Figure 8: Alcohol spending as a share of expenditure by expenditure decile
Yet as we have already suggested, the amount that a household spends on alcohol is not necessarily 
a good proxy of how much alcohol duty they pay. Figure 9 confirms that duty accounts for over 
a third of the money spent on alcohol by the poorest groups in society, but around a fifth for 
the richest. 
Figure 9: Alcohol duty as a share of alcohol expenditure by income/expenditure decile
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Overall distributional effect of alcohol duty
As a result, when we turn to our direct estimate of the amount of alcohol duty paid by different 
households, figure 10 shows that duty looks more clearly regressive on an income basis. Moreover, 
figure 11 shows that duty no longer looks progressive on an expenditure basis, but rather flat 
across most of the income distribution, with the highest spenders paying the least duty and the 
lowest spenders paying the most. 
Figure 10: Alcohol duty as a share of equivalised disposable income by income decile
Figure 11: Alcohol duty as a share of expenditure by spending decile
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That said, it is worth noticing that on an expenditure basis, the confidence intervals on all of the 
eight bottom deciles overlap, so the only groups paying statistically significantly lower alcohol tax 
in proportionate terms than the rest are the top 20%. On an income basis, it is also the case that 
the top two deciles pay clearly less duty in proportionate terms. However, looking at the point 
estimates,6 the downward slope is more clearly defined, and the bottom decile pays a significantly 
higher share of its income in duty than other households. 
As noted above, one reason why alcohol duty may appear more regressive on an income basis is 
because some households in the survey have understated their incomes. Of course, we cannot 
know for certain which households these are. However, one approach is to strip out households 
from the analysis that have an especially large discrepancy between their expenditure and 
their incomes. Figure 12 reproduces the analysis above, excluding households that reported 
spending more than double their reported incomes. This slightly flattens the distribution, with 
the proportion of income spent on alcohol duty in the lowest decile falling by a full 0.1%. Overall, 
though, the distribution remains downward sloping. 
Figure 12: Alcohol duty as a share of equivalised disposable income by income decile (excluding 
households reporting spending >200% of reported income)
Figure 13 shows the same analysis if we lower the threshold for exclusion further to households 
spending over 150% of their reported income. By this point, the distribution on the basis of 
income starts to look more like the distribution on the basis of expenditure, with the two top 
deciles spending clearly the least, but with little difference between the households in the 
middle. Spending on alcohol duty in the bottom decile, though it remains clearly the highest 
point estimate, is no longer significantly higher than spending on duty in the second decile. Of 
course, as the exclusion criterion becomes stricter, the risk of excluding valid reports increases. 
It is extremely unlikely that many households really are spending more than three times their 
6  The numbers presented in the charts, which represents the central estimates, leaving aside the uncertainty around these
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annual income, but far more plausible that households really are spending 50% more.7 At the 
same time, even at the 150% threshold, it is entirely possible that there are inaccurate reports 
remaining in the sample. 
Figure 13: Alcohol duty as a share of equivalised disposable income by income decile (excluding 
households reporting spending >150% of reported income)
Since neither reported income nor reported expenditure are entirely reliable indicators of a 
household’s affluence in the LCFS, we looked at a range of other characteristics to triangulate 
these against. All of these have clear limitations taken on their own. However, in combination, 
they can help us to build up a picture of the distributional consequences of alcohol tax. 
First, we looked at occupational class. While the relationship is not perfect, in general we would 
expect people of higher occupational classes to be richer. Crucially, occupational class is less likely 
to be affected by temporary fluctuations than income or spending, and so may in some cases be 
a better guide to a household’s long-term circumstances. 
The LCFS categorises households according to the occupational class of the household reference 
person – the person who owns the accommodation, is responsible for rent, or who has the highest 
income. Using these classifications, we analysed the proportion of income and expenditure spent 
on alcohol duty by households of different occupational classes.  
7  Particularly since the data comes from two week diaries – in such a short period of time, it is quite possible that people may incur large 
exceptional expenditures.
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Figure 14: Alcohol duty as a share of income/expenditure by occupational class
Figure 14 shows that alcohol duty accounts for a similar share of expenditure for people of all 
occupational classes in the LCFS. People from lower occupational classes do appear to spend 
more of their income on duty, but this is not statistically significant. At worst, then, occupational 
class suggests that duty is only mildly regressive, and perhaps not regressive at all.  
The sort of accommodation a household lives in provides another indicator of how well-off they 
are. Though obviously this is influenced by a number of factors, including age and location, we 
would generally expect those eligible for social housing to be poorer than those in private rental 
accommodation, and those that can afford to own their own homes to be richest. Figure 15 shows 
how spending on alcohol duty varies by housing tenure. It shows that homeowners and those in 
social housing spend similar amounts on alcohol duty as a share of income/expenditure, but that 
people in private rental accommodation spend slightly less. Thus looking at duty payments on 
the basis of housing tenure does not suggest that alcohol duty is regressive.
Figure 15: Alcohol duty as a share of income/expenditure by housing tenure
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Figure 16 shows how alcohol duty spending varies by size of house. It shows little clear relationship 
between the number of rooms in a household’s home and the proportion of their income or 
expenditure accounted for by alcohol duty. It is noticeable, however, that those in the smallest 
houses (three rooms or fewer) do appear to be spending more on duty – though this difference 
is not significantly different from other households. Again, this is evidence that if alcohol duty is 
regressive, it is only mildly so. 
Figure 16: Alcohol duty as a share of income/expenditure by number of rooms in house
Car ownership is another measure of a household’s living standards. Figure 17 plots spending on 
alcohol duty against the number of cars and vans that a household has access to. It shows little 
meaningful difference between different levels of car ownership. 
Figure 17: Alcohol duty as a share of income/expenditure by number of cars and vans
Put together, these analyses suggest that the burden of alcohol taxes are split fairly evenly 
throughout most of the socioeconomic distribution. However, the very richest 10-20% pay slightly 
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less as a share of their incomes and budgets. On some, but not all indicators, the very poorest pay 
slightly more in proportional terms, but it is impossible to be sure because of data limitations. 
Thus alcohol duty is at worst marginally regressive. 
Distributional effect of alcohol duty by beverage type
As well as the overall distributional effect of alcohol duties together, we also looked at the 
distributional effects of taxes on different beverage types. Figure 18 shows how the proportion of 
household income spent on different alcohol duties varies by income decile. Figure 19 shows how 
it varies as a share of spending by expenditure decile. 
Figure 18: Alcohol duty as a share of income by income decile by beverage type
Figure 19: Alcohol duty as a share of spending by expenditure decile by beverage type
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Unsurprisingly, the numbers in figure 18 and 19 reflect the overall pattern of alcohol duty in that 
duty looks more regressive on an income basis compared with an expenditure basis. That said, 
there are clear differences by beverage type. If any alcohol tax is regressive, it is spirits duty, which 
appears clearly regressive on an income basis, and somewhat regressive even on an expenditure 
basis. Beer duty seems fairly regressive on an income basis, but rather flat on an expenditure basis. 
Cider tax also appears to have a slightly higher burden on the poor, but because people drink less 
cider than other products, and because cider tax rates are relatively low, cider duty accounts for a 
much lower share of income and expenditure than other duties. Wine duty, by contrast, looks to 
be somewhat progressive – at least on an expenditure basis. 
Figures 20 to 23 show different alcohol duties as a share of income and expenditure by occupational 
class. These tell broadly the same story. Beer, cider and spirits duty appear to account for a slightly 
larger share of resources of those in lower occupational classes. However, these differences are 
not statistically significant. Wine duty, by contrast, accounts for a higher share of the income 
and expenditure of those in higher occupational classes, and this difference is statistically 
significant – semi-routine, routine workers and the unemployed pay clearly less wine duty than 
professional workers. 
Figure 20: Beer duty as a share of income/expenditure by occupational class
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Figure 21: Cider duty as a share of income/expenditure by occupational class
Figure 22: Wine duty as a share of income/expenditure by occupational class
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Figure 23: Spirits duty as a share of income/expenditure by occupational class
This emerging picture is supported by the analysis in appendix C. Homeowners, people with bigger 
houses and more cars all spend significantly more of their incomes and budgets on wine duty. The 
other alcohol duties look somewhat regressive on these other measures, but not significantly so. 
Taken together, these results suggest that wine duty is clearly progressive, whereas beer, cider 
and spirits are mildly regressive, with spirits duty more regressive than beer or cider duty.
Factors mitigating any regressive impact of alcohol taxes
To this point, we have considered the average level of alcohol tax currently paid by different groups 
in isolation. In evaluating government policy, though, we are more interested in the impact of 
changes in alcohol taxes, and in the broader consequences of such changes beyond their effects 
on alcohol duty payments. When evaluating the distributional impact of an increase or decrease 
in alcohol duty, therefore, there are three additional considerations we should take into account. 
First, there may be differences in price sensitivity between richer and poorer households. If so, then 
the current level of tax paid by a household is not necessarily a reliable guide to the incremental 
impact of any additional tax. If poorer households reduce their alcohol consumption by more in 
response to an increase in alcohol taxes, then the additional amount of tax they end up paying 
will be less than you would expect from the amount they currently pay.8   
Unfortunately, there is little consistent evidence on how the price elasticity of demand for alcohol 
varies between richer and poorer households. In an analysis of Australian drinkers, Jiang et al 
produce the intuitive findings that lower income drinkers are more price sensitive [42]. In the 
UK context, by contrast, Holmes et al find no systematic difference between richer and poorer 
consumers: certain products are more price elastic for those with higher incomes, others for those 
on lower incomes [43]. However, it is important to note that Holmes et al’s elasticities are based off 
a relatively small sample, and consequently many of the estimates are not statistically significant 
8  Though of course, insofar as taxes discourage people from consuming a product that they enjoy, this lost enjoyment ought to be seen as a 
(non-financial) cost. See [41] for further discussion of this point.
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[43]. While it is plausible, then, that poorer drinkers are more price sensitive and therefore face 
less of a financial impact from a duty increase, we cannot be certain this is the case. 
The second thing to remember is that alcohol duty does not exist in a vacuum, but comprises 
part of a wider system of tax and government spending. The net distributional impact of alcohol 
tax therefore depends not only on the direct effects of the tax itself, but also how the government 
chooses to use the revenue it generates. Clearly, if the money from alcohol duty is used to fund a 
reduction in the rate of income tax on high earners, the effects will be regressive. If, by contrast, 
it is used to fund spending or tax cuts that favour the poor, the effects will be progressive. For 
illustration, figure 24 shows the effect of an increase in alcohol duty that raises revenue by 10% 
from all income groups.9 This additional revenue is then assumed to be spent on the NHS, with all 
groups benefiting in proportion to the share of public healthcare spending they currently benefit 
from. The underlying data comes from the ONS’ estimates of the effects of tax and benefits on 
different income groups [44]. Note that since this allocates households to income deciles on 
the basis of their reported income in the LCFS, it is likely to overstate the initial regressivity of 
alcohol duty.
Figure 24: Estimated effect of a 10% increase in alcohol duty revenue, invested in the NHS – 2017/18
Nevertheless, this analysis shows that once the effects of NHS spending are taken into account, 
the net impact of the policy is clearly progressive. Overall, households in the bottom 60% of the 
income distribution are better-off, while those in the top 40% of the income distribution are worse-
off. The effects of the policy are relatively small – despite a relatively large increase in alcohol 
taxes, no income group loses more than 0.1% of its pre-tax income on average.
The third point to keep in mind in considering the impact of alcohol tax on inequality is that poorer 
groups see more of the health benefits. For reasons that are not fully understood, but may include 
different patterns of drinking and interactions between alcohol and other risk factors, poorer 
groups suffer greater alcohol-related harms, despite drinking less on average [45]. This means 
that an increase in alcohol duty would be expected to save proportionately more lives among the 
economically disadvantaged. For example, Meier et al modelled the impact of a 13.4% increase 
in alcohol tax on different occupational groups, and found that it would lead to a 4.9% reduction 
in deaths from alcohol among routine/manual workers, compared to a 4.3% reduction among 
intermediate workers and a 3.3% reduction among professional/managerial workers (figure 25).
9  That is, assuming no difference in price elasticity
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Figure 25: Proportion of alcohol-attributable deaths averted from a 13.4% alcohol tax increase 
in England – 2014/15 [46]
Conclusion
Overall, we find that UK alcohol duties are at worst mildly regressive. In light of the evidence that 
reported income is an unreliable measure of how well-off a household is, we have looked at the 
relationship between spending on alcohol duty and a range of characteristics: total household 
expenditure; occupational class; housing size and tenure; and car ownership. Some of these 
suggest the overall burden of alcohol duty is flat. Other indicators suggest that the very poorest 
households pay slightly more and very richest households slightly less as a share of their resources, 
but still that most groups proportionately similar amounts of alcohol duty. 
However, this picture varies between different alcoholic products. Wine duty does clearly appear 
to be progressive, with richer households paying a proportionately greater share. By contrast, 
poorer households do seem to pay proportionately more beer, cider and particularly spirits duty. 
In any case, when evaluating the impact of particular alcohol tax policies on inequality, we would 
caution against just looking at the current share of income or expenditure spent on alcohol duty. 
There are three additional factors which may well mitigate any regressive impact of an increase 
in alcohol duty. First, poorer households may be more price sensitive, in which case they will 
cut back spending by more in response to an increase in alcohol tax. Second, the revenue from 
alcohol taxes may be used to fund spending or tax cuts that favour the poor. Third, the poor would 
be expected to see greater health benefits from the reductions in drinking that would follow an 
increase in alcohol tax.
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Part 2: How does alcohol tax affect different genders, 
age groups and regions?
As we have outlined, previous research into the distributional effects of alcohol tax has generally 
focused on differences between more or less economically advantaged groups. In this report, we 
attempt to broaden this analysis by exploring how different genders, age groups and regions are 
affected by duty. 
Methods
For the analysis by region, we took the estimates of alcohol duty as a share of income and 
expenditure developed from the LCFS in part 1 and averaged these across the different UK regions.
For the analysis by gender and age, however, we cannot use the LCFS because it collects data at 
the household level, and households often contain both men and women, and people of different 
age groups. Instead, we turn to NHS Digital’s Health Survey for England (HSE), which interviews 
a random sample of individuals in England each year regarding a range of issues to do with their 
health, including alcohol consumption [47-49]. 
Overall, the HSE is believed to have better coverage of alcohol purchases than the LCFS [50], 
although it appears to under-record spirits and cider consumption relative to beer and wine.10 
However, the HSE also has a couple of major limitations. As the name suggests, it covers only 
England, rather than the whole of the UK. Moreover, the HSE does not have very reliable or 
granular income data on many of its respondents, nor any data on spending or other economic 
characteristics, unlike the LCFS. This means that we will generally have to express our estimates 
of alcohol duty in absolute terms, rather than as a proportion of income or expenditure. 
In our analysis, we used pooled data from the 2015, 2016 and 2017 waves of the HSE. To calculate 
the amount of alcohol duty paid by each individual in the survey, we first estimated the volume 
of each type of alcohol that they consume each week. As with the LCFS, we used a standard set of 
assumptions about serving sizes and product strengths, set out in appendices A and B. We then 
calculated the duty chargeable on this consumption, using the duty rates that applied at the time 
of the survey. Note that only the 2016 HSE asked about cider, so our numbers on cider sales come 
only from the one year of the survey.
Since the government publishes official administrative data on the amount of revenue it brings in 
from beer, cider, wine and spirits duty [38], we made sure that our estimates match these totals. 
For example, to estimate the amount of beer duty paid by women, we took the government’s 
average annual recorded beer duty revenue between 2015 and 2017, and multiplied this by the 
proportion of beer duty paid by women in our HSE estimate. These estimates by beverage type 
were then summed to estimate the total amount of duty paid by each group. 
10 In the 2016 survey, spirits account for 12% of total units of alcohol consumed, and cider for 4%. By contrast, more reliable sales figures indicate 
that 24% of the alcohol sold in England and Wales comes from spirits and 10% from cider and perry [51]. 
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Results
Alcohol duty and gender
Overall, we found that women pay around two fifths (39%) of all alcohol duty in the UK (figure 26). 
This amounts to £160 per head each year for women, compared to £250 per head for men (figure 
27) – 36% less on average.
Figure 26: Share of total UK alcohol duty paid by gender, 2015-17 
Figure 27: Annual average UK alcohol duty per capita by gender, 2015-17
 
Figure 28 breaks this down by beverage type. It shows that women in fact pay the majority of wine 
duty – 55% – but relatively little beer or cider duty. This suggests that the government’s decision to 
cut taxes on particular drinks and not others has distributional implications between the genders. 
It is striking that in the past six years, duty on beer, which overwhelmingly falls on men, has fallen 
by 18% in real terms. By contrast, wine duty has been cut by 2% over that period [52]. 
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Figure 28: Share of UK alcohol duty by gender and beverage type, 2015-17 (£m/year)
It is important to note that this sort of gender-based analysis requires us to look at individuals, 
rather than households. In some cases, this may be justified, but in others it may provide a 
misleading picture. Consider a couple where the man drinks only beer and the woman drinks 
only wine. Is it accurate to say that the woman is unaffected by an increase in beer prices, as our 
analysis here would suggest? If the pair have completely separate finances, that may be justified. 
However, if their finances are completely shared, then it is incorrect – the woman is almost as 
much affected by the fact that the couple are paying more for beer, even if she is not drinking it 
herself. Nevertheless, these results suggest that it may be useful to consider the gender impact of 
different alcohol taxes in the future.  
Alcohol duty and age
We also looked at how different alcohol duties affect different age groups. Figure 29 shows that 
middle aged people (45-64 year olds) pay slightly more alcohol duty on average. For example, 55-
64 year olds account for 14% of the adult population, but pay 19% of alcohol duty. By contrast, 
16-34 year olds account for 30% of the population, but pay 26% of all duty. Of course, this does 
not account for their ability to pay – since older people are likely to be richer, alcohol duty may still 
account for a lower share of their income or expenditure than for younger people. 
Figure 29: Share of UK alcohol duty by age group, 2015-17
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Figure 30 then breaks this down by beverage type, and once again displays quite different patterns 
for different drinks. It shows that people under 45 pay 81% of cider duty, but just 31% of wine 
duty. In general, it shows that alcohol duty can be ranked from cider, through spirits and beer, to 
wine in terms of its relative impact on younger people (and the reverse for older people). 
Figure 30: Share of UK alcohol duty by age group and beverage type, 2015-17 (£m)
Alcohol duty and region
Finally, we looked at how the amount of alcohol duty paid varies between different parts of the 
country. The results are shown in figure 31.  
Figure 31: Alcohol duty as a share of income/expenditure by UK region
Figure 31 shows that Londoners pay proportionately the lowest alcohol duty – unsurprisingly, 
since London is both the lowest drinking and richest region of the country. In general, alcohol duty 
appears to account for a greater share of incomes and budgets in the North and Scotland than the 
rest of the country, though the difference is not always large enough to be statistically significant. 
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Figures 32 and 33 break down alcohol duty payments across the different regions into different 
beverage types. Again there are substantial variations. People in the North East of England pay 
clearly the highest share of their income and budgets on beer duty. In general, households in the 
North and Midlands pay proportionately more beer duty. By contrast, Scots pay proportionately 
the most spirits duty, although again it accounts for a lower share of incomes and budgets in the 
South of England. Wine duty has a similar financial impact across all the regions. 
Figure 32: Alcohol duty as a share of equivalised disposable income by region
Figure 33: Alcohol duty as a share of expenditure by region
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Conclusion
This report has gathered the best available evidence and explored the distributional impact of 
alcohol taxes in the UK. For the most part, it has focused on the question of whether alcohol tax 
exacerbates economic inequality, by placing a disproportionate burden on poorer households. 
We have found limited evidence to support that claim. In general, poorer people drink less than 
richer people. However, they pay a similar share of their incomes and budgets on alcohol duty – at 
worst, only slightly more. But any potentially regressive effect of an increase in alcohol tax may be 
offset if poorer households are more price sensitive, if the tax revenue is used by the government 
in a way that benefits the poor or if the poor see greater health benefits from lower drinking. 
Overall, there is little reason for the government to avoid increasing alcohol taxes out of concern 
for the poor.
We have also taken preliminary steps to look at how alcohol tax affects different genders, age 
groups and regions. We have shown that men, the middle aged and those in the North and 
Scotland appear to pay more in alcohol tax. Moreover, the choice of which beverages to tax 
may have significant distributional consequences. In particular, raising wine duty appears to be 
progressive. It will also have a relatively greater impact on women, middle aged drinkers, and 
affect all regions of the country equally. 
As with any fiscal measure, it is important to understand the distributional consequences of 
alcohol taxes. Yet for all the speculation and assumptions made about the impact of UK alcohol 
duty on different groups, the question has received little empirical attention until now. Based 
on the evidence we present here, we find concern for inequalities offers little reason to avoid 
increasing alcohol duty. 
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Appendix A: Assumed container sizes where not 
explicitly captured
LCFS
Drink Assumed volume
Bottle of beer 330ml
Bottle of cider 500ml
Can of cider/beer 440ml
Unspecified beer/cider Pint (568ml)
Small glass wine/champagne 125ml
Medium glass wine/champagne 175ml
Large glass wine/champagne 250ml
Unspecified wine/champagne 175ml
Half bottle (fortified) wine/champagne 375ml
Bottle (fortified) wine/champagne 750ml
Small/medium/unspecified glass fortified wine 50ml
Large glass fortified wine 70ml
Single Spirits/Liquers 25ml
Double Spirits/Liquers 50ml
Bottle Spirits/Liquers 700ml
Bottle alcopop 275ml
HSE
Drink Assumed volume
Small can beer/cider 330ml
Large can beer/cider 440ml
Bottle of beer 330ml
Bottle of cider 500ml
Can of cider/beer 440ml
Small glass wine 125ml
Unspecified glass wine 175ml
Large glass wine 250ml
Bottle wine 750ml
Sherry 50ml
Single Spirits 25ml
Double Spirits/Liquers 50ml
Small can alcopop 250ml
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Appendix B: Assumed ABVs by product
LCFS
Product On-trade ABV Off-trade ABV
Beer 4.4% 4.7%
Spirits 36.8% 37.1%
Alcopops 4.5% 4.5%
HSE
Product ABV
Normal Beer 4.4%
Strong 7.5%
Spirits 37%
Alcopops 4.5%
Appendix C: Additional analyses
Table 1: Alcohol duty as a share of income by housing tenure (standard 
error in brackets)
Class Beer Cider Wine Spirits
Social Housing 0.33% 
(0.026%)
0.04% 
(0.007%)
0.19% 
(0.018%)
0.32% 
(0.031%)
Private rental 0.25% 
(0.015%)
0.02% 
(0.003%)
0.21% 
(0.013%)
0.22% 
(0.017%)
Owned/Rent free 0.23% 
(0.006%)
0.02% 
(0.001%)
0.35% 
(0.008%)
0.26% 
(0.009%)
Table 2: Alcohol duty as a share of spending by housing tenure (standard 
error in brackets)
Class Beer Cider Wine Spirits
Social Housing 0.35% 
(0.028%)
0.04% 
(0.006%)
0.19% 
(0.016%)
0.32% 
(0.028%)
Private rental 0.24% 
(0.013%)
0.02% 
(0.002%)
0.20% 
(0.011%)
0.21% 
(0.016%)
Owned/Rent free 0.26% 
(0.007%)
0.02% 
(0.001%)
0.39% 
(0.008%)
0.28% 
(0.010%)
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Table 3: Alcohol duty as a share of income by number of rooms in house 
(standard error in brackets
Number of 
Rooms
Beer Cider Wine Spirits
3 or fewer 0.33% 
(0.037%)
0.05% 
(0.014%)
0.24% 
(0.024%)
0.38% 
(0.058%)
4 0.25% 
(0.019%)
0.02% 
(0.004%)
0.26% 
(0.018%)
0.27% 
(0.020%)
5 0.25% 
(0.011%)
0.02% 
(0.002%)
0.26% 
(0.012%)
0.25% 
(0.015%)
6 0.26% 
(0.013%)
0.02% 
(0.001%)
0.31% 
(0.013%)
0.27% 
(0.017%)
7 0.25% 
(0.019%)
0.01% 
(0.002%)
0.33% 
(0.015%)
0.24% 
(0.019%)
8+ 0.19% 
(0.009%)
0.01% 
(0.002%)
0.41% 
(0.018%)
0.21% 
(0.016%)
Table 4: Alcohol duty as a share of expenditure by number of rooms in 
house (standard error in brackets)
Number of 
Rooms
Beer Cider Wine Spirits
3 or fewer 0.36% 
(0.044%)
0.04% 
(0.011%)
0.26% 
(0.023%)
0.38% 
(0.050%)
4 0.26% 
(0.018%)
0.02% 
(0.003%)
0.27% 
(0.017%)
0.28% 
(0.021%)
5 0.28% 
(0.013%)
0.02% 
(0.002%)
0.28% 
(0.011%)
0.26% 
(0.015%)
6 0.29% 
(0.014%)
0.02% 
(0.001%)
0.33% 
(0.013%)
0.28% 
(0.018%)
7 0.27% 
(0.018%)
0.02% 
(0.002%)
0.37% 
(0.016%)
0.26% 
(0.019%)
8+ 0.20% 
(0.008%)
0.01% 
(0.001%)
0.44% 
(0.017%)
0.21% 
(0.015%)
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Table 5: Alcohol duty as a share of income by number of cars (standard 
error in brackets)
Number of Cars/
Vans
Beer Cider Wine Spirits
0 0.29% 
(0.020%)
0.03% 
(0.006%)
0.22% 
(0.016%)
0.32% 
(0.026%)
1 0.25% 
(0.009%)
0.02% 
(0.001%)
0.31% 
(0.009%)
0.26% 
(0.011%)
2 0.22% 
(0.008%)
0.01% 
(0.001%)
0.35% 
(0.012%)
0.21% 
(0.010%)
3 0.20% 
(0.016%)
0.02% 
(0.002%)
0.33% 
(0.030%)
0.20% 
(0.022%)
4+ 0.32% 
(0.042%)
0.02% 
(0.004%)
0.33% 
(0.047%)
0.23% 
(0.044%)
Table 6: Alcohol duty as a share of expenditure by number of cars 
(standard error in brackets)
Number of Cars/
Vans
Beer Cider Wine Spirits
0 0.31% 
(0.022%)
0.03% 
(0.004%)
0.23% 
(0.014%)
0.35% 
(0.025%)
1 0.26% 
(0.009%)
0.02% 
(0.001%)
0.33% 
(0.009%)
0.27% 
(0.011%)
2 0.25% 
(0.009%)
0.01% 
(0.001%)
0.39% 
(0.012%)
0.22% 
(0.011%)
3 0.23% 
(0.016%)
0.02% 
(0.003%)
0.37% 
(0.032%)
0.22% 
(0.022%)
4+ 0.33% 
(0.038%)
0.03% 
(0.005%)
0.40% 
(0.062%)
0.23% 
(0.042%)
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